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“All out”: the dismantling of the face in Murphy
By Garin Dowd
“Yes, the face has a great future, but only if it is destroyed, dismantled.”
—Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (A Thousand Plateaus 171)
Year zero
The present essay brings into dialogue the concern evinced in Murphy with the 
question of form and the “pragmatics” (or schizoanalysis) of non-conformity 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari developed in A Thousand Plateaus. They 
deﬁ ne “pragmatics” as “a politics of language”; it insists, as Jean-Jacques 
Lecercle has commented, “on the materiality of language, on its origins in the 
primary processes of the body” (129).  Deriving impetus from Bakhtin, they 
argue against models of linguistics that sequester language from the extra-
linguistic by means of an operation identiﬁ ed as “extracting constants” (85). 
The constants—be they of the order of syntax, morphology, and phonematics—
serve, in a problematic fashion, to tie “the statement to a signiﬁ er and enunciation 
to a subject” (85). For Deleuze and Guattari this is a ﬂ awed understanding of 
language. On the one hand it presupposes a regime of ﬁ gure and ground, and on 
the other is based on a hierarchy that ensures that the extra-linguistic operates 
according to a model of causality that ultimately keeps the linguistic free of 
the corporeal, the social and the political. It fails, in Deleuze and Guattari’s 
terms, because it is insufﬁ ciently abstract, or abstract in the wrong way, and is 
unable, therefore to “reach the abstract machine that connects a language to the 
semantic and pragmatic contents of statements, to collective assemblages of 
enunciation, to a whole micropolitics of the social ﬁ eld” (7).
For Deleuze and Guattari such architecture should be and is in A Thousand 
Plateaus subject to torsion whereby the corporeal, social, and political are all 
regarded as immanent to language. It is in the concept of the speech act that this 
relation can be seen in its exemplary operation, and which Deleuze and Guattari 
take to be the basis for their whole approach to the postulates of linguistics in 
plateau 4 of the book,  “November 20, 1923: Postulates of Linguistics.” If 
speech acts concern a transformation effectuated upon bodies by words—as 
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in the iteration by a judge of a judicial sentence upon a person found guilty of 
a crime—they (along with the transformation) operate within language, rather 
than are the expression of power exterior to language but employing it as a 
conduit: “The instantaneousness of the order-word, its immediacy, gives it a 
power of variation in relation to the bodies to which the transformation is 
attributed” (82). The order-word is part of a grid that manifests itself in the 
social ﬁ eld. It operates in two spheres of this ﬁ eld identiﬁ ed as signiﬁ ance on 
the one hand and subjectiﬁ cation on the other. Signiﬁ ance—a term borrowed 
from the linguistics of Emile Benveniste—which may be understood as 
“signifying capacity,” for Deleuze and Guattari, should not be left in the domain 
of the exclusively linguistic or textual. Signiﬁ ance and subjectiﬁ cation operate 
according to binary logic and biunivocal relationships and these, Deleuze 
and Guattari assert, “dominate psychoanalysis . . ., linguistics, structuralism” 
(5).  Such is their antipathy to Saussurian linguistics and its heritage that they 
conclude: “In truth, signiﬁ ance and interpretosis are the two diseases of the 
earth or the skin, in other words, humankind’s fundamental neurosis” (114). 
In an illuminating study, Zsuzsa Baross has referred to the aspects of 
Deleuze’s approach to language that highlight speciﬁ c divergences from 
the habits of thought associated with deconstruction and with Jacques 
Derrida in particular. The abyssal, deferred, and vertiginous depth 
disclosed by deconstruction is made to come to the surface of Deleuze’s 
“dermatology,” giving what is described as “a philosophy of nomination 
and not of discourse” (33). It is in this respect that the linguistics of 
Hjelmslev is crucial. His theory of language, as Deleuze and Guattari 
see it, disrupts the “discredited notions of the signiﬁ er and the signiﬁ ed” 
(42) by virtue of its distinction, “Not between forms and substances 
but between content and expression, expression having just as much 
substance as content, just as much form as expression” (44). 
In Deleuze’s conception, writing (or certain types of writing, often in what 
Deleuze and Guattari call a “minor” mode), as a force of de-stratiﬁ cation, 
deformation, and scrambling, moves to the limit of language where it “may 
arrest the irresistible movement of its own graphic mark toward becoming 
sign, semeia, signiﬁ cation” (33).1 This “planeology” or “dermatology” ﬁ nds 
itself strikingly instantiated in plateau 7 of A Thousand Plateaus, the chapter 
that forms the central conceptual strand in the present study. There, signiﬁ ance 
and subjectiﬁ cation are recast as the two components of the system of social 
organization identiﬁ ed by Deleuze and Guattari as the white screen-black hole 
system that they summarize under the concept of “faciality” (visagéité).
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As Deleuze would later formulate the question, the face has three roles: 
it is individuating (it distinguishes or characterises each person); 
it is socialising (it manifests a social role); it is relational or 
communicating (it ensures not only communication between 
two people, but also, in a single person, the internal agreement 
between his character and his role). (Cinema 1 99)2
A speciﬁ c area of organization operative in art and literature in particular, but 
nonetheless investing all areas of social organization—insofar as faciality 
names an essential and inescapable aspect of signiﬁ cation and subject 
formation—faciality is given a separate chapter by Deleuze and Guattari in A 
Thousand Plateaus. 
The face and its effacement
Insofar as we intend to focus on Murphy by means of the conceptual framework 
provided by faciality, some key orientations in the lead-up to the faciality 
plateau as sketched brieﬂ y above require reiteration in order to signal the 
speciﬁ c mobilization to which these will be subject in the pages that follow.
1. Interpretation as a “disease of the earth”
2. Subjectiﬁ cation linked to subjection
3. Face of the loved one in passional love as possible location for 
destratiﬁ cation
4. Destratiﬁ cation/defacing. 
All of these orientations ﬁ nd a particular coalescence in faciality. The face is 
central to interpretation. It signiﬁ es; signiﬁ cation requires it: “faciality reigns 
materially over that whole constellation of signiﬁ ances and interpretations” 
(115). The face of the deity in the temple, or the face of the god as administered 
by the priest, or the despotic face are prerequisites for subjection, while in the 
establishment of the white face as that from which other faces are thought of 
as deviations, in the massive enterprise of imperial expansion and colonial 
consolidation in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a speciﬁ c form of 
subjection operates along racial lines (182). The face becomes the locus 
of fetishized investment in passional love in which “each subject provides 
statements for the other to identify themselves with” (Goodchild 110). Given 
the amalgamation of disparate areas of sociality in this list it is perhaps 
already to some extent clear that faciality does not name a value or principle 
identiﬁ ed as either intrinsically to be supported or to be abhorred. Such would 
be contradictory of the abiding commitment to a thinking of immanence in 
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Deleuze and Guattari’s thought.3 This is where the fourth entry in the above list 
is required: de-stratiﬁ cation is the force of undoing that can serve to dismantle 
the gridding, exclusionary, and reifying regimes of faciality. Importantly, 
however, de-stratiﬁ cation is immanent to faciality rather than introduced from 
outside its architecture. 
The context in which Deleuze develops his own distinct, albeit intimately 
linked, approach to faciality is, perhaps not surprisingly, in his analysis of the 
close-up in cinema. If painting, as we shall later see, had released a certain 
potential of the represented face as analyzed in A Thousand Plateaus, cinema 
goes further still because of the possibilities established by the technological 
advance that it represents as such and the rapid developments in approaches to 
montage, framing, and image capture to which it gave rise in the key second 
and third decades of the twentieth century. The face as it appears in cinema 
already participates in the dynamic of ﬁ gure and ground identiﬁ ed as the poles 
of the regime of faciality. The following passage from Cinema 1 elaborates on 
this conjunction:
The face is this organ-carrying plate of nerves which has 
sacriﬁ ced most of its global mobility and which gathers or 
expresses in a free way all kinds of tiny local movements 
which the rest of the body usually keeps hidden. Each time 
we discover these two poles in something—reﬂ ecting surface 
and intensive micro-movements—we can say that this thing 
has been treated as a face: it has been ‘envisaged’ or rather 
‘faciﬁ ed’ [visagiﬁ ée], and in turn it stares at us [dévisage], it 
looks at us. . . . even if it does not resemble a face. (89)
The classical close-up, typiﬁ ed by D.W. Grifﬁ th, ensures a partial reﬂ ection in 
so far as the face looks in a direction different from that of the camera, and thus 
“forces the spectator to rebound on the surface of the screen” (94), but in the 
case of Josef Von  Sternberg there is a particular use of the “intensive” close-up 
of the face by virtue of the fact that his faces refract light, rather than simply 
reﬂ ect it: “[T]he face is displaced, raised in the shallow depth, darkened at 
the edges, and enters into an intensive series depending on whether the ﬁ gure 
slides towards the dark edge, or the edge slides towards the light ﬁ gure” (95).
By deﬁ nition, according to Deleuze, the background becomes an “any-space 
whatever” when a close up is involved—even in depth of ﬁ eld such as we 
witness in the ﬁ lms of Orson Welles. The loss of spatio-temporal co-ordinates 
that the close-up/affection image instantiates is inherent to the close-up but 
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accentuated in certain approaches to ﬁ lmmaking. Deleuze identiﬁ es Ingmar 
Bergman as the director who goes furthest in a use of the close-up that will 
push the loss of co-ordinates to the limit.  Citing the director’s own words 
emphasizing that “drawing near to the human face is the primary originality 
and the distinctive quality of the cinema,” Deleuze links the abandonment of a 
profession, renunciation of a social role, refusal of communication and loss of 
individuation to a pervasive dissolution operative in Bergman’s ﬁ lms of these 
functions of the face (99). In ﬁ lms such as Persona “[t]he close-up has . . . 
pushed the face to those regions where the principle of individuation ceases to 
hold sway” (100). In suspending individuation the facial close-up is both the 
face and its effacement. This effacement is in part because the face in close-
up empties speciﬁ city—in extreme close-up the face is unrecognizable; it is 
monstrous, and effectively inhuman.4 Bergman attains the plane of immanence 
of cinema by making the “photogramme” itself “burn, with Fear as its only 
affect” (100). It is at this point that Deleuze makes a statement of great interest 
as far as our present purposes are concerned. Having some thirty pages earlier 
in Cinema I identiﬁ ed Beckett’s Film as establishing the very conditions of 
possibility of future experimental ﬁ lm by setting out to extinguish action-
images, perception-images, and affection-images, we now learn that Bergman 
is equaled in his face-effacement enterprise by none other than Beckett.
Film and Proust
The concern with faciality as understood by Deleuze, which we are about to 
claim of the novel, is therefore not limited to Murphy. Film betrays a particular 
interest in the theme, perhaps largely because of the speciﬁ c characteristics 
of cinematographic representation. One of the most interesting aspects of the 
ﬁ lm is that in its scenic directions as effectuated in the screenplay, through the 
explicit invocation of a restriction on camera movement (“angle of immunity”), 
Beckett evokes, while signiﬁ cantly modifying, one of the conventions of 
cinematographic artiﬁ ce, namely the rule of 180 degrees that decrees that, for 
reasons of spatial and orientational logic for the viewer, in its movement in order 
to represent the mutual perception of, or communication between, two subjects 
or the perception by a subject of an object, the camera not exceed this angle. 
When this convention is disregarded by certain directors the camera can begin 
to take on the “machinic” life which the convention helps to occlude.  While 
in Film the two characters are not in mutual perception or communication, O’s 
face remaining hidden (with two brief exceptions corrected by E) to E until the 
ﬁ nal scene (which in fact ﬁ nally releases O and E into “mutual” perception), 
the fact that E is also taken to be the camera itself invites association with 
the 180 degree convention. In Film the 45 degree angle of immunity serves, 
the ﬁ lm reveals at the end, to protect the character O from self-recognition. 
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As character, however, the camera is, in the ﬁ rst instance already, in facing 
the character O, operating at the limit of the 180 degree opening. This means 
that when the angle is opened by E as camera beyond the 45 degree angle 
of immunity the transgression is simultaneously an encroachment by E as 
character beyond the 180 degree opening. The camera-as-character of Film
attempts to probe a zone that it is debarred, ﬁ rst by convention and second by 
Beckett’s own extra-diegetic proscription, from entering. The very re-marking, 
however, of the convention means that as industry guideline it comes to inhabit 
the diegetic space (by means of its reﬂ ection and carrying out, more precisely 
“acting” out, of the screenplay’s explicit directives). Hence the re-marking in 
the screenplay serves to split the convention between two roles, one proﬁ lmic 
the other not. One is interior, the other exterior. Film itself becomes the name 
of a zone or membrane between the two.
In this sense the work Film, or the labor that is undertaken by Beckett under 
this title, is “prophylactic” or “membranic.” What he creates is the interface 
itself; neither the viewing nor the viewed can hold their place, but are subject 
to an oscillation in and on boundaries and borders. The interest in the theme 
of enclosure is part of this problematic as explored in the ﬁ lm. O shufﬂ es 
along the wall, and refuses frontality; his is always a sideways orientation, 
or gaze and bodily trajectory within a spatial economy of dislocation. The 
terror is reserved for facing (signiﬁ ed by the “angle of immunity” in Film), for 
perceiv ing the façade of the self; its home; its partition; its boundary, the wall 
containing its perceptual and sensory oriﬁ ces: mouth, nose, eyes.5
The concern with the affection-image and therefore with the close-up, as 
Deleuze understands it, is advanced further in Beckett’s plays for television, 
a discussion of which I will undertake in another study. It is, however, also 
perhaps because of Beckett’s detailed knowledge of Proust, with its insistent 
evocations of a ﬁ gure-ground dynamic (signifying regime), but no less of its 
heavy investment in faces as legers of time’s passage, that may account for the 
preoccupations in this regard of Murphy.
One of the signifying regimes Proust foregrounded and both Deleuze and 
Beckett picked up on in their respective studies separated by three decades 
is faces as morphological register of time’s passage, as in the “Bal de 
têtes” section of Le Temps retrouvé, and (especially in the case of faces of 
the beloved) as metamorphic and anamorphic registers of multiplicity. The 
following is one of the innumerable examples of a face looming out of the 
matinée to confront the narrator:
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Les lignes ne résistaient pas à cet agrandissement. Celle du 
nez se brisait de près, s’arrondissait, envahie par les mêmes 
cercles huileux que le reste de la ﬁ gure; et de près les yeux 
rentraient sous les poches qui détruissaient le resemblance du 
visage actuel avec celle du visage d’autrefois qu’on avait cru 
retrouver. (Proust, Le Temps 344) 
Nor could the lines of the face stand up to this magniﬁ cation. 
That of the nose was seen now to be broken and rounded, its 
regularity marred by the same oily patches as the rest of the 
face; and the eyes at short range retreated behind pockets of 
ﬂ esh which destroyed the resemblance of the person before 
me to the one whom I had known in the past and thought that 
I had met again. (Proust, In Search of 6: 318)
The narrator concludes that the age of the invitees increases along with the 
enlargement of the face upon his approach as it does with the possibility of 
observing the face from different angles. Age for him “était amenée par le 
progrès moins des années que, dans la vision de l’observateur, du degré de 
l’échelle” (344); (“was made apparent not so much by the advance of the years 
as by a greater degree of accuracy in the scale of the observer’s vision” [319]). 
For Beckett in his account of Proustian individuation (anticipating Deleuze), 
Albertine is the coalescence formed out of the little band at Balbec: “She has no 
individuality. She is merely one blossom in this fragile hedge of Pennsylvanian 
roses breaking the line of the waves” (Proust 46). From this premise, with the 
understanding that, once “captive,” Albertine has been detached from this band, 
Beckett goes on to enumerate the processes whereby Albertine is subjected to 
a series of subtractions from the “ﬁ rst Albertine” of the little band. The ﬁ rst 
Albertine as he describes her is reduced and displaced to a second characterized 
by a set of attributes and thence to a third mutation of those attributes. Beckett 
lists four attributes of the second Albertine that ﬁ nd themselves subjected to 
a downgrading at the third remove. What is especially interesting from the 
point of view of a Deleuzean context here is that, of the four, two attributes 
pertain to Albertine’s face. The ﬁ rst is “the effect of a declamatory beauty-
spot on her chin” (46), the second “the provisional inﬂ ammation of her temple 
constituting an optical centre of gravity about which the composition of her 
features is organised” (46-47).6
Beckett stresses that this multiplicity of strata in Albertine puts the “subject” 
into parentheses.7 Indeed a consequence is the abeyance of the subject as a 
category. In the terms Deleuze later developed, Albertine is an individuation,
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not an identity. The migration, as Beckett puts it, of her beauty-spot from chin 
to lip is not only a movement across a superﬁ cies or façade that would contain 
the manifold or the multiplicity under a deteminant form; it is rather indicative 
of a turmoil and mutation “in depth,” of a “turmoil of objective and immanent 
contradictions over which the subject has no control” (47).
The emphasis on the face is even more apparent in Beckett’s transition (in a 
description that preﬁ gures his account of the face of Cooper in Murphy) in the 
course of his argument to:
Yet he already concludes, before the kaleidoscope of her 
expressions, before this face that from being all surface, smooth 
and waxed, passes to an almost ﬂ uid state of translucid gaiety, 
and from the chiselled polish of an opal to the feverish black-
red congestion of a cyclamen, that the Name is an example 
of a barbarous society’s primitivism, and as conventionally 
inadequate as ‘Homer’ or ‘the sea.’ (47-48)
Beckett here is alert to aspects of Proustian individuation that Deleuze and 
Guattari would later schematize in terms of the “white wall, black hole” 
model of identiﬁ cation, but he is also alert speciﬁ cally to the convertibility of 
surface into black hole and vice-versa, the susceptibility of the captured face 
to monstrism:
But even as this new Albertine is multiple, and just as the 
most modern applications of photography can frame a single 
church successively in the arcades of all the others and the 
entire horizon in the arch of a bridge or between two adjacent 
leaves, thus decomposing the illusion of a solid object into its 
manifold component aspects, so the short journey of his lips to 
the cheek of Albertine creates ten Albertines, and transforms a 
human banality into a many-headed goddess. (49)
The example of the approach to the cheek of Albertine is for Deleuze, as for 
Beckett, articulated in terms of planes and of a proliferation of objects such 
that it is molecularized or compartmentalized and fragmented.8 There is a 
jump from plane to plane (anticipating the machinic connect and cut of the 
Anti-Oedipus).
It is fascinating that Beckett in the emphasis he places on certain of his 
examples that he anticipates Deleuze in many respects. He already identiﬁ es 
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the face as a privileged site for the playing out of Proust’s thanatography, and 
is, moreover, alert to the redemptive role played by the work of art as vocation 
within the context of a future-oriented labor: 
It will be necessary, for example, to interrupt (disﬁ gure) the 
luminous projection of subject desire with the comic relief 
of features. It will be impossible to prepare the hundreds 
of masks that rightly belong to the objects of even his most 
disinterested scrutiny. (11-12) 
It is my contention that the interest in the face and in faciality (understood in 
the context introduced above and developed below in relation to Deleuze and 
Guattari) in Proust is carried through into Murphy.
Faciality
Faciality as it is analyzed in Plateau 7 names a particular modality of 
organization, formation, or engendering. The chapter is given “year zero” 
as its temporal co-ordinate because it marks the beginning of the so-called 
Christian era. The association with the ﬁ gure and face of Christ here in part 
arises because of the central role played by a divinity or the representation of a 
divinity, either in the form of plastic representation, or through its representative 
in the “temple.” The key contribution of Christianity to faciality is that it 
causes the complete interpenetration of signiﬁ ance and subjectiﬁ cation (of 
white wall and black hole). Christ is central also because of his role in the 
development of Western painting that serves as another organizing idea in 
Plateau 7. In painting, they assert: 
Not only did Christ preside over the facialization of the entire 
body (his own) and the landscapiﬁ cation of all milieus (his 
own), but he composed all of the elementary faces and had 
every divergence at his disposal: Christ-athlete at the fair, 
Christ-Mannerist queer, Christ-Negro. (178)
They exemplify this presiding role by way of illustration that will come back 
later: in Giotto’s fresco (in the Vatican library) depicting the transﬁ guration of 
St. Francis: 
against the white background of the landscape and the black-
blue hole of the sky, the cruciﬁ ed Christ-turned-kite-machine 
sends stigmata to Saint Francis by rays; the stigmata effect 
the facialization of the body of the saint, in the image of the 
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body of Christ; but the rays carrying the stigmata to the saint 
are also the strings Francis uses to pull the divine kite. It was 
under the sign of the cross that people learned to steer the face 
and processes of facialization in all directions. (178-79)
Guattari’s approach to the question of the face and representation may be 
traced to his attempt to disavow certain orthodoxies of Freudian and Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, and in particular the role of the face in certain theories of 
infant psychology, not least in the Lacanian mirror phase. More speciﬁ cally
Psychoanalysis is a deﬁ nite case of a mixed semiotic: a despotic 
regime of signiﬁ ance and interpretation, with irradiation of the 
face, but also an authoritarian regime of subjectiﬁ cation and 
prophetism, with a turning away of the face (the positioning 
of the psychoanalyst behind the patient suddenly takes on its 
full signiﬁ cance). (Plateaus 125)
The system of faciality has two components: white walls (upon which 
signiﬁ ance inscribes its signs and redundancies) and black holes (in which 
it lodges its consciousness, passion, and redundancies). Their combination 
yields “[a] broad face with white cheeks, a chalk face with eyes cut in for a 
black hole. Clown head, white clown, moon-white mime, angel of death, Holy 
Shroud” (Plateaus 167). That these two com ponents or values (white walls, 
black holes) could, in another philoso phical system, designate on the one 
hand a “positive” value—with the white wall being regarded as ﬂ at, solid and 
capable of being projected upon—and on the other a “negative” value—with 
the black hole thought of as, inter alia, a vortex, an absence, or anti-matter, 
does not mean that a binary function will characterize their ultimate use here. 
Indeed it comes as no surprise to the reader of Deleuze and Guattari already 
familiar with their work that these values are established only to be suspended, 
amounting to a vectorial rather than an encompassing arrangement of terrain.
For these two values are not themselves ﬁ xed within a hierarchical system; it 
is the Face that makes them ﬁ xed and that makes them signify. The Face, so-
named to designate a quasi-Platonic status as a Form, is the set of operations 
performed on the abstract machine of faciality.9 Through its pervasive 
annexing drive, the Face functions such that it will “landscapize” (in the case 
of landscape) or “subjectivize” (in the case of the body) any outcropping or 
emergence of the pure abstract machine. The abstract machine of faciality 
further serves in its general function to 
Dowd: “All Out”
81
set up functional correlations between distinctions made on 
one level and analo gous distinctions on another, suggesting 
a web of standardized symbolic relays between levels. This 
authorizes one to proceed metaphorically from any given 
distinction to its counterpart on any level. (Massumi 173n54)
This explains how the landscape is codiﬁ ed as a face, or as if a face. Correlatively 
this is how body parts can be invested semiotically to the extent that they too 
become “facialized.” The Face, then, touches all levels and imbues them with 
co-ordinates upon which a recognition function can ﬁ nd omnipresent refuge. 
A kind of immunity from a-signifying neutrality is granted, while there will 
al ways be a satisfying trace of subjectivity, a crumb at least of sub stance. As 
Deleuze and Guattari characterized, a particular colonization or conjugation 
facilitate such immunity and refuge: “The movement of the black hole across the 
screen, the trajectory of the third eye over the surface of reference, constitutes 
so many dichoto mies or arborescences” (Plateaus 177). The vectorized space 
is colonized and made subject to retrospective formation. The Holy Shroud 
becomes the presence of Christ.10
The conversion of this “pure” machine into an abstract machine of faciality 
indicates the tendency towards Form and conformity (where there is 
form there is nothing but conformities, as Deleuze reports in Difference 
and Repetition [134]). The abstract ma chine of faciality as Deleuze and 
Guattari envision it comprises the white wall/black hole system (with what 
they describe as its hovering Christ = black hole/central computer) as well 
as the machine selecting and rejecting faces that do not conform (despotic 
machine of faciality). However, the abstract machine (even one of faciality) 
can “return” in order to “defacialize” (190), and a facialized body that has 
not been subject to defacialization, its surroundings and objects, coupled with 
the “landscapiﬁ cation” (paysagéiﬁ ciation) of all worlds and milieus (181) 
describes what can be summarized in an equation: Christi anized = Facialized. 
One possibility of the year zero of the title of plateau 7 is, Deleuze and Guattari 
suggest, with a heavy dose of irony, that a new Christ be installed, in the form 
of Spinoza. Less ironically intended is the argument that, instead of forcing 
ﬂ ows into signiﬁ ances and subjects, which is what the Face-Christianity 
does, what is needed is an ethology (derived from Spinoza’s Ethics). Spinoza 
furnishes a way of theorizing what Deleuze and Guattari call at this point in 
plateau 7 “inhumanities,” the inhumanities that make up humans. Access to 
these inhumanities is equivalent to ﬁ nding the ‘probe head’ under the face; it 
is an essentially “demonic” operation:
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In short, between substantial forms and determined subjects, 
between the two, there is not only a whole operation of demonic 
local transports but a natural play of haecceities, degrees, 
intensities, events, and accidents that compose individua tions 
totally different from those of the well-formed subjects that 
receive them. (Plateaus 253)
This in-between state of affairs is that of the pure abstract machine, as opposed 
to the abstract machine already become an abstract machine of faciality. 
Whereas the latter gives elements that already tend toward form and function, 
the former are “abstract” even though perfectly real (253-54). On this level 
Deleuze and Guattari address the question of univocity under the inspiration 
of Spinoza: “A ﬁ xed plane of life upon which everything stirs, slows down 
or accelerates [précipite]” (255). It is time to turn in more detail to Murphy
to explore the nature of its participation in faciality within the context of a 
more pervasive novelistic ethology within and on a univocal plane (or plane 
of immanence).11
The faces of Murphy
Murphy, not surprisingly, has given rise to a number of readings that emphasize 
its ﬁ gure ground relation, either in the terms provide by Gestalt psychology—
familiar of course to the author—or by recourse to concepts derived from the 
history of art. Morphē or Murphy: the shape, we often read, of chaos.12 This 
is a novel that takes its name from “form” and that is reducible to an erudite 
disquisition through the medium of the novel upon the form of the novel. 
Various critics have formulated compelling accounts of the nature of Murphy’s 
experiment with novelistic form in so far as this latter endeavor is bound up 
with a more pervasive interest in the (philoso phical and aesthetic) question of 
form as such.13
In particular however there is a predilection for the concept in a very speciﬁ c 
modality in several readings of Mur phy to have emerged in post-1990 studies, 
namely anamorphosis. Indeed Leslie Hill’s attempt to suggest the author’s 
cryptic signature may be found spread across Murphy as well as throughout 
the work, or, indeed, across the corpus is in its way an argument for an 
anamorphic conception of the signature that has a precedent in anamorphic 
art itself.14 In Jacques Lacan’s reading of Holbein’s Ambassadors—during 
the course of which his indebtedness to Jurgis Baltrusaïtis (the author 
most associated with the concept) is acknowledged—through recourse to 
anamorphosis (speciﬁ cally the distended skull) the artist “makes visible for 
us here something that is simply the subject as annihilated” (88).15 While 
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according to the letter of Lacan’s elaboration of the concept (leaving to one 
the problematic hermeneutic stamp of castration) a certain transposition to 
the world of Murphy would perhaps fall under the category of “superﬁ cial” 
resemblance to anamorpho sis, the concept nonetheless remains richly 
suggestive in respect of the novel, and thus it will return later.16
The ﬁ rst exchange of dialogue in Murphy establishes what is arguably the 
central antagonism of the novel, that between the Newtonian-Pythago rean 
Neary and the non-Newtonian Murphy. Where Neary, via the form of Miss 
Dwyer, seeks ﬁ gure and face (these are deemed equiva lent), Murphy (whose 
name of course paradoxically suggests morphē, or Greek “form”) ﬂ ees form, 
even though he will think of, and occa sionally be detained by, what could be 
formed or take form on the way. The source for one and the destination for the 
other is “the big blooming buzzing confusion” (“I think of Miss Dwyer” says 
Neary, the text following his theorem with, “Murphy could have thought of a 
Miss Counihan” [6-7, emphasis added]).
It is the fact that in its ﬁ rst and yet so central and generative ex change that it is 
the face that Neary selects in order to identify the essence of Miss Dwyer, or 
the index of her emergence as form, into form, that is of speciﬁ c interest here, 
insofar as it both inaugurates the antagonism of Neary and Murphy and sparks 
off the ﬁ rst of many “ral lies” between body and mind (7) that will enliven the 
proceedings amongst the novel’s moribund marionettes. Indeed it will be argued 
below that it is possible to read Mur phy—or a stratum of the novel—in the 
context of what Neary refers to as “the system of faces.” Faces (with the eyes—
the agents, metaphorically speaking, of all countenancing—often functioning as 
a synecdoche) are inclined, to the ﬁ rmament in both brightness (12, 39, 42) and 
obscu rity (54), to the sky both replete and abandoned (141), to an “anoint[ing]” 
light (27),17 to solar and lunar (62) orbs themselves described as faces (75-76), 
to rain, to weather of all sorts (27, 39, 156), to other faces (18, 140), to rear-ends 
(which in Murphy themselves are often “faces” capable of expression); faces 
are frozen in torpor (36), ravaged and in shadow (67), “narrow and seamed” 
(11), clamped into various types of millinery (158), set off by skulls and cranial 
domes of various dimensions, hues, and degrees of hirsuteness (11, 62, 67, 105); 
they can be highly mobile of feature (140) or they can be blank screens; they can 
have eyes open or closed; closed they are a shuttered façade (as in the “defence 
of West Brompton,  by West Brompton, against West Brompton” [70] with its 
shutters down), open, open for business. Eyes are either sunken (as is the case 
with Mr. Kelly, 11) into inhuman inexpressiveness (30) or give off illumination 
themselves (“blue glitter of the eyes in the depth of their orbit”: 17, 155). The 
eyes can form a gaze that is “py thonic,” “delphique,” (24) or “chessy” (135) 
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and, with out necessarily furnishing a gaze, they can also be “like a gull’s” (26). 
Faces have both color (notably yellow [21], “blue and olive” [135]) and weight, 
and occa sionally both (“leaden face” [19] or “tête plombée” in the French ver-
sion of the novel [25]). 
The faces, along with their features, like other parts of Mr. Kelly’s corporeal 
expanse, can migrate (67, 139), as in the voltefesses attrib uted by the novel 
to Neary locally (112) and to Socrates via intertex tual relay (as noted in the 
novel itself: 112), or be migrated to, as in the suppressed whiskers of Neary 
that were (before they were “sup pressed without pity”) the outcropping of 
a “virility” lacking other corporeal channels for expression (30-31).18 In the 
end the star-gazing (a pastime including looking at and for Celia [12, 21, 54, 
56]) is a scrutiny of the expanse, into or out of which latter deﬁ nition may or 
may not emerge (106). Murphy himself is such a blotch (single com pact and 
organized, to employ Neary’s words to Murphy [7]) under the scrutiny of Mr. 
Endon (from the Greek for “within” as Ackerley notes); he is merely a speck in 
Endon’s unseen (140), a speck in a backdrop (or “backwash” as Dream of Fair 
to Middling Women puts it), even though his sky is merely a void. The cosmos 
is the screen out of which form can be arrived at; otherwise, “Tous les jours le 
visage blanc sous les spasmes blanchâtres” in a formulation Beckett added to 
the French translation (53, emphasis added). Star-gazing, then, as mediated via 
a “corpus” either of “deterrents” or “incentives,” is facing, looking for “face” 
or countenance: it is hermeneutics, or form imposed on forces. 
Posture (which has already been brieﬂ y discussed above) of course is another 
way in which, in a corporeal context, form is imposed on forces. The face-down 
posture is notable for its frequency in Murphy, giving distended, distorted, and 
hidden faces. This is how Rosie Dew ends up accosting Murphy in the Cockpit 
in Hyde Park (57). Celia is also found in this way on the bed (62) and will, 
reciprocally, ﬁ nd Murphy similarly arrayed, albeit in his case on the ﬂ oor (20), 
while the “old boy” upstairs from them dies when he “falls on his face with the 
razor under him, zzzeeeppp” according to Miss Carridge’s “onomatopoei(c)” 
report (84). These are instances in the novel’s system of faces where the face 
is “counter actualized,” de-faced, or de-ﬁ gured. There is no one to face, no 
one to scrutinize, no one to yield face, or to countenance. The faces face away 
from the scrutinizing subject (“Is it its back that the moon can never turn to 
the earth, or its face?” asks the narrator [75-76]). One might say, adopting 
the French version’s formulation, that it is where “le monde s’effaça” (11, 
my emphasis). The system of Faces, façades, and facing cannot access the 
concrete multiplicity of faces. 
Dowd: “All Out”
85
Murphy and Murphy in anamorphic repose 
When, out of the big blooming buzzing confusion, the ﬂ ux of forms (65), or 
matrix of surds (66), a face emerges what occurs is the genesis of form and 
line, but also of social organization, conjugality, and coupling (the “music” that 
Murphy attempts to get out of his head). When Murphy acquires an address he 
also acquires a marital status (or at least becomes engaged to marry): “so all 
things limp to gether for the only possible” (131), declares the novel in a pared 
down palimpsest of Leibniz.
Cooper’s agile features constitute a high-speed economical index of the 
face that, despite the phenomenal speed of its alterations, remains under the 
determining form of the Face:
Now Cooper’s face, though it did not seem to move a muscle, 
brought together and threw off in a single grimace the ﬁ nest 
shades of irresolution, revulsion, dog like devotion, catlike 
discretion, fatigue, hunger, thirst and reserves of strength, in 
a very small fraction of the time that the ﬁ nest oratory would 
require for a greatly inferior evasion, and without exposing its 
proprietor to misquotation. (115)
Cooper, by profession himself an agent of retrieval, is an example of multiplicity 
delivered over a threshold of unity. The novel however has other thresholds 
that permit no such deliverance, as when the “abstract faciality ma chine” is 
switched on, exempliﬁ ed by Murphy when he manages to speed his rock up 
to the velocity required for him to come out in his mind or to enter his zone. 
Deleuze and Guattari would perhaps see in this moment the “probe head” 
beginning to “de-facialize” the face, creating the conditions for the proliferation 
of other abstract machines (in Deleuze’s analysis of the paintings of Bacon 
the “meat” overwhelms the Face and ﬁ gurality [Francis Bacon]).19 Murphy 
also manages to get close to such a state in playing chess. The face that peers 
through the judas into Mr. Endon’s cell in Murphy is the face of the institution 
of psychiatry with its taxonomical and often carceral modus operandi. Such 
a manner of facing should enable the maintenance of subject-object relations, 
the surveillant and the surveilled frontally arranged. Such of course is not the 
arrangement sustained in the encounters between Murphy and Mr. Endon: “Mr 
Murphy is a speck in Mr Endon’s unseen” (140); here subjectivization has 
broken down. The carefully named ob ject—Murphy—dwindles to the status 
of an undifferentiated “blotch,” but within Mr. Endon’s (as subject) out of 
ﬁ eld vision. In their extreme intimacy, however, anamorphosis contaminates 
distance by introduc ing a distorted spacing and distribution of perceiver and 
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perceived. The facing players plunge back into a state of abyssal and recursive 
façade. The face is defaced at the interface.
The ﬁ nal volume of the Recherche, as already stated above, convenes upon the 
appearance, shocking to the narrator, of old friends at the hôtel de Guermantes. 
The “Bal de têtes” section, if one follows the terminology Deleuze and Guat-
tari proposed, is still organized according to an economy of white wall/black 
hole with salvation in the form of the work of art to which the narrator is 
apprenticed. By contrast, for an instant at the end of Beckett’s novel—
the dialogue of which springs into action with talk of the face—there is a 
dismantling of this economy in line with the operation of what Deleuze and 
Guattari would call the “probe-head” (“tête chercheuse”; 190). Mr. Kelly is, at 
this juncture, in his only other position (the ﬁ rst is cruciform or “pinioned”). 
He is found in Hyde Park in an attitude that retains some of its afﬁ nity with the 
posture of the cruciﬁ ed Christ, albeit with kite rather than cross in hands: “he 
lay sideways in the chair, his cheek on his shoulder, a fold of the slicker lifting 
his lip in a mild snarl” (158).20 The composite picture, with its stricken land-
bound body and its airborne, and ultimately fugitive, representative creates an 
oblique association with another component of Christian belief, the Ascension 
of Christ. However, while through a process of deformation Mr. Kelly’s face 
becomes a “cramp of bones” and succumbs to the forces playing within, Celia’s 
face is, concomitantly, obscured: what is thereby occluded is the white wall. 
Meanwhile the heart—that very important organ in this novel—is fatigued 
and appears to be diminishing in tempo. The organ, at any rate, is cut out 
of the novel at this almost last moment. In the ab sence of the white screen, 
with a Christ who has neither died nor risen (replaced in an inverted form—in 
the anamorphic and atomized form of a outspread/widespread Murphy on the 
barroom ﬂ oor), there is no white wall for recognition to be played out. In 
such a world it is no longer possible for the levers to be like the tired heart; 
society’s “is like” becomes a painfully personalized “is” (Massumi 173). The 
strictly limited social “foyer” of Murphy, where Proustian mondanité has been 
replaced by more marginal or impoverished modalities of social intercourse 
(Balbec plage, courtyard, salon, and the piazza San Marco give way to Cork 
County, asylum and digs, public house and Brewery Road), then, yields a 
vortex of subject-object relations with no possibility of conferring coordinates, 
perspective, and distance in order for a subject or its avatar to thrive. No simile 
plays about the slowed down bodies of this ﬁ nale without ﬁ nality. Not even the 
solace of metaphor offers the vestige of resolution. The levels have collapsed 
on to one another; the hierarchy with a vertical relay system organizing and 
policing analogical gymnastics is no more. Moreover, Celia (ciel là: simply 
there; and tellingly it is Kelly who puns on her name [68]) also closes her eyes: 
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the black hole disappears, refuge of sub jectiﬁ cation. Kelly—the face now that 
Dwyer has receded from the novel—is a cramp of bones, where once it was a 
featured haven of “craters between nose and cheekbones” (69).21
In his writings on ﬁ lm Eisenstein affords a key role to the spectator who, in 
dealing with monstrous incongruities of scale and disjointed imagery on the 
cinema screen, reassembles “the disintegrated phenomena into a single whole 
but from our own perspective, in the light of our own orientation towards the 
phenomenon” (17). The extreme facial close-up in cinema for a viewer sitting 
close to the screen and, for Proust, the beloved face as the lover moves toward it 
are both instances of a kind of anamorphosis. Murphy has its own anamorphic 
elements that assist in the task of articulating another way in which the novel, 
in its interrogation of faciality, is Spinozist (that much debated and divisive 
alleged backdrop to the novel), an instance of “spinozism acharné.” Murphy 
is given to us whole at the start and dispersed at the end.22 His subjectivity is 
perhaps, in Lacanian terms quoted above, annihilated. In Mr. Endon’s cornea 
can be discerned “Murphy’s own image but horribly reduced, obscured and 
distorted.” Mr. Kelly is said to be “spread over a vast area” (73). The novel 
begins with the tethered Murphy and ends with the broken string of the kite. It 
begins with Murphy out of it (the sun) and ends with the “All out” of dusk. It 
begins with Murphy in his chair and ends with Mr. Kelly out of his. So, to what 
extent is Mur phy’s “wandering to ﬁ nd home” (6) an anamorphic journey, as 
de scribed by Baltrusaïtis: “instead of reducing forms to their visible lim its, it 
projects them outside themselves and distorts them so that when viewed from 
a certain point they return to normal”? (1). For Hill, such a return is not the 
trajectory of the novel since it remains ﬁ rmly committed to the “purgatorial” 
line identiﬁ ed in the essay “Dante…Bruno. Vico..Joyce” (1929). Speciﬁ cally, 
Hill argues that one consequence of the chiastic patterning of the novel is 
the maintenance of the abeyance from form that Beckett identiﬁ es with the 
Joyce’s purgatorial mode. As far as the present taxonomy of faces, facing, 
and perspectival approaches to surfaces is concerned, while Cooper could 
be said to conform to the anamorphic correction, in returning to normal 
spatial, vectorial, and velocity arrangements, Mur phy remains caught in the 
“purgatorial distension” of the anamor photic: in him the logic of redemption 
and return (to form) is refused.
Conclusion: Voltefesses
Murphy’s moribund marionettes, it has been suggested above, play out a 
sub-Proustian thanatography. The paradox of the immersion and at once the 
transcendence of the protagonist in the world of Beckett’s novel, occupying 
as he does the role of puppeteer of the others without himself being sustained 
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by the life-support of narrative voice, may be regarded as a reworking, 
impoverishment and subversion of Proustian narration. Over the course of its 
thirteen chapters, with the sixth in the mid dle delineating the complexities of 
Murphy’s mind, the novel’s her meneutic grids of astrology, psychiatry, and 
detection all slide over one another and are subject to a-signifying rupture and 
scrambling in the world of the characters, in a manner that anticipates Nathalie 
Sarraute’s formulation (which not surprisingly is quoted afﬁ rmatively by 
Deleuze and Guattari) of sous-conversation.23 If faciality names a system that 
ﬁ xes the life-form into an interpretive grid, and if Proust ultimately conforms 
to the gridding possibilities of white wall-black hole framework, as opposed 
to the line-of-ﬂ ight modality, Beckett in Murphy generates multiple grids 
divested of unifying perspectival integrity. In the section of his Ethics entitled 
“Of Human Bondage,” Spinoza describes the necessity of proportion to the 
interaction of rest and mo tion if the human form is to be maintained: “What 
constitutes the form of the human body is this, that its parts communicate 
their motions to one another in a certain ﬁ xed proportion” (192). What ever 
maintains this proportion, Spinoza continues, is good because it facilitates 
the human body in affecting other bodies. Conversely, anything that upsets 
this proportion causes a metamorphosis in the human body. In changing 
form the human body dies. Death is under stood here as the absence of the 
ability to be affected. In its dismantling of ﬁ gure and ground relations, in its 
unfurling of folds of escape from interpretive grids (and from grids in which 
those folds are already implicated), Murphy participates in a dismantling of 
the system Deleuze and Guattari call faciality. If Proust ends with salvation 
via the redemptive powers of the work of art, Beckett returns to year zero (or 
perhaps 33 AD) in a sweep toward the exhaustion of protagonist and followers 
in the exeunt from Hyde Park. Prior to the novel’s end the protagonist has 
himself been the subject of a literary pietà; an autopsy that remarks his loss 
of recognizability save for his endurance as a mark, a stain, “porto maison, 
a port-winer,” within the space of the mortuary, within the asylum, the asile
(the shelter or refuge). As the remains of Murphy lie on the mortuary slab, his 
physical and mental marks endure, as does his originary landscape or surface 
(“indelible Dublin” as the coroner puts it), encapsulated in the various lists with 
which those in attendance respond: “Neary saw Clonmachnois on the slab, 
the castle of the O’Melaghlins, meadow, eskers, thatch on white, something 
red, the wide bright water, Connaught” (150). Miss Counihan, following her 
departure from the mortuary, conjures her own list of the homeland: “Oh hand 
in hand let us return to the dear land of our birth, the bays, the bogs, the moors, 
the glens, the lakes, the rivers, the streams, the brooks, the mists, the—er—
fens, the—er—glens, by tonight’s mail-train.” The endurance of the mark is 
sufﬁ cient at this juncture to enable the clamping down of the escaped body, the 
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exploded subject. Not for long: the fetishized birth mark—enduring black hole 
of subjectiﬁ cation—is spread along with the rest of the Murphy corpus on the 
bar room ﬂ oor, slipping out of the grip of Cooper:
By closing time the body, mind and soul of Murphy were 
freely distributed over the ﬂ oor of the saloon; and before 
another dayspring greyened the earth had been swept away 
with the sand, the beer, the butts, the glass, the matches, the 
spits, the vomit. (154)
The body, mind, and soul of Murphy have gone. Exit the mark of form, its 
marker, its place-marker, its remarkable efﬁ gy, its face or façade. Despite 
the attempts of the mourners, post-mortem, contours—national, corporeal, 
subjective, objective—do not hold in the Murphy cosmos; corporeal frontiers 
begin to burgeon and blend: “the skull gushed from under the cap . . . the 
ravaged face was a cramp of bones, throttled sounds jostled in the throat” 
(158). The combination of anamorphosis and synaes thesia here is suggestive 
of a post-Morphē universe. The stratiﬁ cations of Morphē are in abeyance. The 
puppet strings are severed and the stigmata are adrift without a body to which to 
be ﬁ xed: there is no one in Murphy’s image.24 But the Murphy cheek is not the 
only voltefesse of the novel. Neary had prior to the pursuit of the protagonist to 
London discovered an aspect of faciality that precipitates his breakdown in the 
General Post Ofﬁ ce. Having attacked the buttocks of the Statue of Cuchulainn 
with his own head he explains:
“That deathless rump was trying to stare me down.”
“But there is no rump,” said Wylie. “How could there be? 
What chance would a rump have in the GPO?”
“I tell you I saw it,” said Neary, “trying to downface me.” 
(36)25
An efﬁ gy and a monument thus face each other across the Irish sea: Murphy’s 
buttock in mute fesse-à-fesse with Cuchulainn’s, both in their own ways enduring 
beyond historical and personal vicissitudes, Murphy’s birthmark remaining a 
fetish for Miss Counihan on the mortuary slab, the bronze Red Branch bum 
as rendered by Oliver Sheppard an overcoding nucleus in the GPO. Yet in this 
dying light, this purging, and purgatorial space with its refrain of “All out,” form 
is extinguished, switched off, being as if liquidated by the opening of a valve, 
something vital stirs: the play of forces that Deleuze would, in his late writings, 
call “a life”: “A ﬁ xed plane of life upon which everything stirs, slows down or 
accelerates [précipite]” (Essays 255). Where Proust’s “Bal de têtes” delivers an 
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Eisensteinian monstrism—giants, as Proust’s narrator has it—secured within 
the grand and monumental dimensions of the evolving (and for Beckett would-
be embalming) work of art, Beckett gives the reader the distended skull-mind 
of his protagonist and the quite distinct monstrism of leakage, blending, and 
purgatorial deferral (exhaustion) in the parade of death’s heads of his own ﬁ nale. 
If not entirely susceptible to being coaxed into systematic shape (to paraphrase 
Shira Wolosky), Murphy, in its dismantling of the face, undeniably plays host to 
shadows of Spinozist philosophical concepts and to their afterlife in the thought 
of Deleuze and Guattari, and announces a de-stratiﬁ cation that sweeps through 
character, form, nation, and homeland. All out.
Notes
1. Later referred to in A Thousand Plateaus as the principle of a-signifying rupture. For 
an illuminating account of the centrality of style to Deleuze’s theory of writing, see Lecercle.
2. In Roland Barthes’s analysis in Mythologies (1957) the face of Greta Garbo is a pure 
mask that operates as a reifying essence, or Platonic Idea, whereas that of Au drey Hepburn, 
simultaneously “child” and “kitten,” is the face as “event,” “con stituted by an inﬁ nite complexity 
of morphological functions” (57). 
3. As we are reminded when they assert that on a molecular level “microfascisms” can lie 
awaiting the opportunity to coalesce (Plateaus 215).
4. Deleuze and Guattari are, however, careful to state that “It would be an error to 
proceed as though the face became inhuman only beyond a certain threshold: close-up, 
magniﬁ cation, recondite expression, etc. The inhuman in human beings: that is what the face 
is from the start. It is by nature a close-up, with its inanimate white surfaces, its shining black 
holes, its emptiness and boredom” (Plateaus 171).
5. Skin too perhaps, since the naked body might be closer to a face than is the clothed 
version, a blank face (such as is furnished in a voltefesses). Cf. Dream of Fair to Mid dling 
Women with its façade penetrated by façade (46).
6. See Deleuze, Proust and Signs 176 on the same passage.
7. The novel itself describes Albertine as a plastic multiplicity: “Had I not detected in 
Albertine one of those girls beneath whose envelope of ﬂ esh more hidden persons stir, I will not 
say than in a pack of cards still in its box, a closed cathedral or theatre before we enter it, but 
than in the whole vast ever-changing crowd” (Proust, In Search of 5: 99).
8. As Deleuze puts it, “And in each vase an I which lives, which perceives. Which desires 
and remembers, which keeps vigil or which sleeps, which dies, commits suicide and comes 
back to life in ﬁ ts and starts: the “crumbling”, the “splitting up” of the Albertine to which a 
multiplication of selves responds” (Proust and Signs 125).
9. “The face is an organised whole” (Murphy 38).
10. Hill and Bryden, in their respective studies, have gone furthest in analyzing the trope 
of cruciﬁ xion in Beckett’s work. For Hill this latter operates as the “sign of an unre solved 
conundrum, as a paradigm for the strange impossibility of joining word and ﬂ esh together 
in such a way as to give birth to a speaking human subject in whom name and body share a 
common bond of identity” (104). See also Bryden 45-62. John Banville’s novel Shroud (2002), 
set in Turin and featuring a much anticipated and eventually abandoned visit to view the 
shroud, makes for interesting reading in this context. In a related context, the strange news that 
Pier Paolo Pasolini hears, from, as Hardt puts it, the “impure angel” of the cruciﬁ xion is that 
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through this self-emptying rather than the conﬁ rmation, via correspondence and conformity, 
of the form of God, in reality what one is left with is “merely a hollow husk.” Paradoxically, 
“The self-emptying or keno sis of Christ, the evacuation of the transcendental, is the 
afﬁ rmation of the plenitude of the material, the fullness of the ﬂ esh” and an absence of media-
tion. Instead incarnation is herald of the “intimate complementarity” of transcendence and 
the immanent (Hardt 78-79). Also see Grossman: “L’homme-Christ Beck ettien est recruciﬁ é 
jusqu’à la ﬁ n des temps pour rien” (“The Beckettian Christ-man is re-cruciﬁ ed until the end of 
time for nothing” [61]).
11. For Foucault, “[univocity] is paradoxically the princi pal condition which permits 
difference to escape the domination of identity” (192).
12. As Rabaté remarks, “The submerged Morphē enables Beckett to connect the god of 
sleep, trance, and half-death with the philosophically loaded interrogation of form” (151). 
Ackerley offers a series of original additions to the mor phē/morpheme debate (1).
13. Hill’s account also draws out an important link between the essay on Joyce and the 
experiment of Murphy, making particular reference to the “purgatorial” mode that Beckett 
favors.
14. As noted indeed by Hill himself (113). Cf. Asensi, who in refer ring to J. Hillis Miller’s 
reading of Wallace Stevens’s “The Rock” writes of how, “The opposition between the literal 
and the ﬁ gurative remains (they exchange their places, but never fuse); the frictions among the 
irreducible meanings are kept; the anamor phosis of the pictogram of the ‘i’ looks at us from the 
text” (264).
15. Guattari is unequivocal about the halt on processuality that this ﬁ gure (castration) 
endorses: “Lacan’s phallic function, in so far as it over-codes each partial object, does not give 
them back a particular identity . . . [and thereby] distributing a lack to each, [it calls] . . . on another 
form of totalization, this time in the symbolic order” (qtd. in Deleuze, Desert Islands 222).
16. “There is no doubt that anamorphosis contributes to the overturning of forms [he 
wrote] which opened up the way to every sort of deviation; but the resemblance [he is writing 
speciﬁ cally about surrealism] is only superﬁ cial” (Lacan 130).
17. Not rendered in the French translation.
18. “He thought of his latest voltefesses, at once so pleasant and so painful. Pleasant in 
that Miss Counihan had been eased; painful, in that Murphy had been made worse; fesses, 
as being the part best qualiﬁ ed by nature no only to be kicked but also to mock the kicker, a 
paradox strikingly illustrated by Socrates, when he turned up the tail of his abolla at the trees” 
(112-13).
19. Antonioli’s gloss on the notion of the pre-face is worth quoting: “L’homme n’est fait que 
d’inhumanités, mais elles suivent des natures et des vitesses très dif férentes: dans l’inhumanitié 
du pré-visage la tête reste une appartenance d’un corps qui ne cesse de se déterritorialiser sur 
des devenirs spirituels et animaux, dans l’inhumanité à venir au-delà du visage de nouvelles 
lignes de déterritorialisation for ment d’étranges devenirs nouveaux, de nouvelles polyvocités 
clandestines” (“Man is made up of nothing but inhumanities, but these adopt very different 
natures and speeds: in the inhumanity of the pre-face the head remains a belonging of the body 
which ceaselessly deterritorializes itself on spiritual and animal becomings; in the inhumanity 
to come beyond the face new lines of deterritorialization form strange new becomings, new 
clandestine polyvalences” [206]).
20. In a link that it would be perhaps be fanciful to pursue here, Deleuze and Guattari 
develop a link between the representation of Christ in renaissance art and his transformation as 
a kind of kite (see comments on Giotto above).
21. The pun is “s’il y a.”
22. For Lecercle the novel possesses “a self-destroying incipit that immedi ately ruins the 
expectations it evokes” (227).
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23. “[C]e qui dissimule derrière le monologue intérieur: un foissonnement innombrable de 
sensations, d’images, de sentiments, de souvenirs, d’impulsions, de petits actes larvés qu’aucun 
langage intérieur n’exprime” (“that which hides behind the interior monologue: a swarming 
of innumerable sen sations, images, feelings, memories, impulses, little larval acts which no 
interior language expresses” [Sarraute 96]).
24. The narrator of the Recherche is, in terms that derive from L’Anti-Œdipe, and that anticipate 
the reading of Giotto in A Thousand Plateaus, an organless body or body without organs (181), the 
strange “plasticity” (182) of which enables it to send out “sticky threads” (182) to open ves sels, 
in order, Deleuze writes, “to make the characters so many mario nettes of his delirium, so many 
intensive powers of his organless body, so many proﬁ les of his own madness” (182).
25. See also the linked “voltefesses” (40) and “cheek by jowl” joke about relations at the 
Mercyseat. My reading of the buttocks encounter, while downplaying the histori cal referents to 
which Beckett was so deliberately attuned in choosing this statue in this location—scene of the 
1916 rebellion (i.e. the Rising)—and necessarily fore grounding certain locutions while ignoring 
others (not least the Victorian rendering of “Red Branch”—albeit in the formulation “Red Branch 
bum” (30)—for a member of the Fianna), is not, in my view, necessarily at the expense of those 
referents. On these latter McCormack’s reading remains indispensable. Beckett’s rendering of 
the key moment in the French translation is “ce cul impérissable qui voulait me faire baisser 
les yeux,” although he jettisons the reinforcement of the facial referent by giving “m’intimider” 
(46) for the English “downface me.”
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